Moral Motivation, Directions of Fit, and Some of Their Implications for Philosophy of Religion

“Moral motivation” is one of the most important and widely used concepts in moral philosophy. Moral motivation is in close relation with two key terms in moral philosophy, i.e. “reasons for action” and “moral judgment”. People often do their actions with reasons, and motivational reasons are one of those reasons. People also make moral judgments, and “motivation” is what links judgments to actions. Philosophers of action agree that the agent must be motivated to do the action. A dominant theory among philosopher, known as “Humean theory”, considers two psychological states of “desire” and “belief” to be effective in motivating an agent to act. According to the “Humean theory” of motivation, “desire” is an intrinsically motivational state, with a world- to- mind direction of fit, and “belief” is an intrinsically cognitive state, with a mind- to- world direction of fit. Some moral philosophers deny the generality of Humean theory and consider at least some of our moral beliefs to be cognitive-motivational, with both two directions of fit. The view of the recent philosophers, in my mind, has the merit of being applied to religious beliefs as well. In this case, at least some of our religious beliefs and the statements expressing them should have both two directions of fit. Accepting this view, accordingly, will help us lead to new and two-faceted approaches to religious epistemology and religious language.

کلیدواژه ها:

Moral motivation ، reasons for action ، belief/desire ، directions of fit ، religious epistemology ، Religious Language